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Abstract This essay discusses the use of analogies
drawn from the Holocaust in cultural representations
and critical scholarship on dementia. The paper starts
with a discussion of references to the death camp in
cultural narratives about dementia, specifically Annie
Ernaux’s account of her mother’s dementia in I Remain
in Darkness. It goes on to develop a critique of Italian
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics
and Bbare life,^ focusing specifically on the linguistic
foundations of his thinking. This underpins a consider-
ation of the limitations of his philosophy and ontologi-
cally derived notions of weakness and passivity in imag-
ining life with dementia as a potential site of agency or
as the locus for transformative ideas about care, com-
munity, and non-instrumentalist conceptions of human
value.
Keywords Dementia . Literature and life-writing .
Personhood . Human value . Care . Holocaust . Giorgio
Agamben . Bare life
Introduction: The Spectre of the Camp
The spectre of the death camp haunts a number of
literary, memorial, and scholarly responses to the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century global
Bdementia crisis.^ This essay develops a critique of this
analogical landscape as part of a broader endeavour to
think through the ideological dimensions of the very
notion of a dementia Bcrisis^ and the ways in which this
has become yoked to political, ethical, and economic
evaluations of particular groups of people and to asso-
ciated debates around the sustainability and manage-
ment of care in later life (Burke 2016, 2017). Implicit
here too is a claim about the contribution of critical and
cultural theory to an understanding of contemporary
cultural epistemologies of dementia. I am interested in
the ways in which the kind of provocative and specula-
tive readings that literary, theoretical, and cultural schol-
arship enables, unfettered by the methodological con-
straints of sociological or scientific enquiry, opens up a
space in which to defamiliarize and trouble dominant
representational modalities of dementia and assump-
tions about the challenges with which it presents us.
In the first part of the essay, I discuss the French
feminist writer Annie Ernaux’s account of her mother’s
dementia and hospitalization in I Remain in Darkness
(Ernaux 1999). I focus in particular upon the implica-
tions of her symbolic association between the long-stay
geriatric ward and the death camp wherein the person
with dementia, like the condemned camp prisoner, is
depicted as the abjected expression of its deathly logic. I
then go on to explore the paradigm of the camp as an
explanatory concept by way of a discussion of the work
of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben and his
provocative claim in Homo Sacer that the camp is the
Bnomos of the modern^ (Agamben 1998). My aim here,
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following scholars such as Sergei Prozorov (Prozorov
2014), is to elucidate Agamben’s philosophical account
of biopolitics and the production of what he calls Bbare
life^ in the broader context of the linguistic foundations
of his thinking. Agamben’s view of the indistinct sepa-
ration between the structure of language and its utter-
ance informs his characterization of the aporetic poten-
tiality of human experience. This indeterminacy gives
rise to the potency of Agamben’s biopolitics, but it also
provides a contextualization of his work that is often
missing in dementia scholarship in which his work is
cited, and it enables me to identify some the limitations
of his thesis in relation to our thinking about dementia
today. My aim is to show that these limitations are
indicative of broader problems with some dominant
cultural epistemologies of the Bdementia crisis^ and its
exemplary status in current debates about personhood
and care. My argument acknowledges that Agamben’s
work helps us to identify the mechanisms that produce
the person with dementia as one around whom key
debates about value and the limits of meaningful life
circulate. However, what I propose here, in the final
section of the essay, is that we need to move beyond
the political and ethical limitations of this paradigm in
order to think differently about the political and ethical
dimensions of dementia and care.
Phantoms from Buchenwald—Reading Annie
Ernaux’s I Remain in Darkness
It is difficult to imagine any other condition that elicits
such forensic attention to the abjected, leaky, and
shameful body than that of dementia (Burke 2016) as
it is depicted in literature and lifewriting. As many
scholars have noted, this symbolic economy reinforces
the notion of dementia as a source of unmitigated dread
or despair; a condition whose cultural legibility is rou-
tinely mediated in the gothic mode as an unfolding
horror show populated by monsters and zombies
(Herskovits 1995; Basting 2009; Cohen-Shalev and
Marcus 2013; Chivers 2011; Behuniak 2011; Wearing
2013). However, my focus in this essay is not so much
the prevalence of the gothic mode but rather the para-
digm that underpins the proliferation of tropes that con-
figure dementia as a condition between life and death.
This paradigm is that of Giorgio Agamben’s concept of
Bbare life,^ a figuration of political abjection that finds
its most powerful expression in the spatial and temporal
logic of the death camp. We can locate figures of Bbare
life^ in narrative accounts of the institutionalization of
people with dementia. For instance, in I Remain in
Darkness, Annie Ernaux’s account of her mother’s final
years living with dementia, she records her visits to her
mother in hospital in April 1984:
Sunday 8
[…] Today she was in a different room with two
bedridden ladies, both silent. She had been tied to
her armchair […] I untied her to walk along the
corridor and show the nurse her eyes. I so hate
seeing her naked flesh when I lift her up in the
hospital gown parts at the back.
In the corridor, through half -open door, I
glimpsed a woman with her legs in the air. In the
next bed, another woman was moaning just like
one does during orgasm. Tonight everything was
surreal and the sun was beating down.
Saturday 14
She is eating the strawberry tart I have brought
her, picking the fruit out from the custard. BThey
have no regard for me here, they make me work
like a slave, we’re not even fed properly.^ Her
perennial obsessions, her fear of poverty which I
have long forgotten. Opposite us, an emaciated
woman, a phantom from Buchenwald, is sitting
on her bed, her back straight, a fearful expression
in her eyes. She lifts up her chemise and you can
see the diaper sheathing her vagina. Such scenes
inspire horror on television. Here it’s different.
These are women. (Ernaux 1999, 18–19)
Ernaux’s evocation of Buchenwald death camp as a
means to express the Bhorrors^ of the scene on the ward
offers a deliberately provocative and disturbing image
of the effects of dementia. In referring to one of the most
powerful cultural touchstones of human suffering, pow-
erlessness and abjection—the death camp of the
Holocaust—this analogy crystallizes her visceral re-
sponse to the sights and sounds of the hospital and the
violent de-realization of the personhood of the older
women she encounters. Ernaux describes her book as
the unedited, transcription of notes she took during her
mother’s final illness. It is thus presented to us as a form
of raw, authentic testimonial that bears witness to her
Bbewilderment and distress^ (Ernaux) in the face of her
mother’s dementia. However, as Ross Chambers re-
minds us, the Bevent of witnessing^ is Bnot so much a
descriptive practice (whether historical or fictional) as it
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is a symbolic practice with its own distinct rhetoricity^
(Chambers 2004, 35). Chamber’s point is important in
that it reminds us that witnessing itself is always medi-
ated by both the generic conventions of testimony as a
form with its own distinct history, politics, and ethics
(Beverley 2004; Smith and Watson 2012) and by the
particular epistemological frames that make sense of
that which is witnessed. In this sense, what Ernaux tells
us are unedited Bvestiges of pain^ (Ernaux 1999, 8)
cannot be viewed as either straightforward or reliable
descriptions in the manner of an Beye-witness^ account.
Indeed, to take up and extend Kali Tal’s claim that
Bbearing witness is an aggressive act^ (Tal 1996, 7), I
Remain in Darkness is a text that encodes an aggression
that is both outward and inward looking, an expression
of extreme pain and anger. The affective power of this
testimony is inextricably bound up with the emphasis on
deficit and loss in dominant epistemologies of dementia.
It is notable that references to bodily abjection and
matter out of place dominate the sparse journal entries
that make up the narrative. These range from her
mother’s Bshit filled^ underwear and the excrement
Ernaux finds hidden in the drawer of her bedside table
(Ernaux 1999) or on the floor by an armchair, to the
casual exposure of her mother’s vagina and soiled dia-
pers and the unsettling Borgasmic moaning^ described
in the passage above. Awash with descriptions of urine
and faeces, the text thus performatively enacts and rein-
forces a powerful epistemology of dementia as funda-
mentally abject and obscene. The crucial point here is
not the veracity of Ernaux’s descriptions but that they
express a particular perception of dementia as inherently
Bobscene^ and therefore suggest that these images of
abjection are intrinsic to the condition itself rather than
symptomatic of inadequate care, support, or
understanding.
Since the Holocaust has been repeatedly configured
as the most unspeakable form of suffering (Adorno
1973; Lyotard 1988), then something more significant
is arguably taking place when it is evoked in narrative
accounts of living with dementia. Indeed, the symbolic
power of this analogy resides in its extreme encapsula-
tion of the perceived impact of dementia upon person-
hood. Its enunciation enacts the near absolute dissolu-
tion of the unique, concrete, and particular features of
the individual into a generic category of suffering
marked by a type of death in life, thus reducing demen-
tia to an expression of the abyssal point of humanity and
the terminus of hope.
The symbolic association between the institutional-
ized person with dementia and the death camp encapsu-
lated in the reference to Buchenwald is not peculiar to
Ernaux. Phantoms from the Holocaust haunt many cul-
tural, journalistic, and theoretical representations of de-
mentia, aging, and institutional care in more or less
explicit ways (Goldman 2017). For example, we can
see precisely this association in Catherine Malabou’s
philosophical account of the psychical trauma enacted
by Alzheimer’s disease (Malabou 2012). Malabou’s
discussion of dementia is underpinned by her elabora-
tion of Bruno Bettleheim’s now largely discredited work
on the similarity between children with autism and the
Musselmann (Levi 1989) of the death camps
(Bettelheim 1972). Malabou develops Bettleheim’s
comparison between the traumatic symptoms manifest
by people in the camps and neurological damage in
order to describe the effects of Alzheimer’s disease.
Combining Bettleheim’s impressionistic assertions with
selected neuroscientific claims culled from the work of
Antonio Damasio (1999, 2003, 2006), Joseph LeDoux
(2002), and Oliver Sacks (1973, 1995, 1998), she thus
develops her hypothesis that Bpatients with Alzheimer’s
disease or, more generally, patients with brain lesions,
behave as if they are suffering from war trauma^ of the
kind associated with Holocaust survivors (Malabou
2012, xviii). In keeping with this claim, her description
of her grandmother’s transformation because of
Alzheimer’s into Bthe work of the disease, its opus, its
own sculpture^ (xi) is symbolically aligned with
Ernaux’s reference to the Bphantom from Buchenwald^
(Burke 2017, 89). Both writers emphasize the evacua-
tion of the person in the face of the organic destruction
wrought by the disease.
With this sense of extreme and absolute nature of
suffering in mind, it is important to note that the associ-
ation between the death camp and the long-stay ward or
care home often reflects more than symbolic correspon-
dences between the two spaces (Capstick 2017; Leibing
2006; Goldman 2017, 220). References to the similarity
between the camp Bvictim^ and the person with demen-
tia occur in newspaper reports on poor care as a means
to express something of the violence of institutional
imprisonment and neglect. For instance, in 2008 the
U.K. tabloid, The Daily Mail ran a headline BCare home
left my mother looking like a concentration camp
victim^ (Hale 2008), and in December 2016, a number
of newspapers in the United Kingdom reported the case
of a Holocaust survivor in her nineties who compared
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her experience in a care home to being imprisoned in a
Nazi camp (see, for example, Bingham 2016).
In I Remain in Darkness, Ernaux notes that on the
geriatric ward her mother must wear garments provided
by the hospital and Bcan have nothing of her own^ (30).
If this recalls the removal of the clothing and posses-
sions of the camp prisoners then the condition of the
hospital wards, reeking of Bfood, urine and shit^ and the
habitual use of restraints to tie unruly patients down
describe an environment that reduces people to an ani-
mal existence; BThe place is a cage. My mother is a
solitary figure^ (30).
This sense of profound spatial isolation is coupled
with an emphasis upon temporal dislocation and the
separation of the person from the rhythms and rituals
of social life. As Ernaux notes, the space of the ward is
one in which the passage of chronological time no
longer matters:
Wednesday 5
Indoors, the same warm temperature, year-round.
There are no more seasons. (32)
[…]
Sunday 9
There are clocks all over the place, in the hall, the
dining room and the bedrooms; none of them
gives the right time: 6 o’clock instead of 4 o’clock
… Do they do it on purpose? (42)
This description of life on the ward is of an existence
outside meaningful temporal divisions, in which con-
ventional markers of progress and change are
suspended; there are Bno more seasons^ and none of
the clocks tell the right time. This aligns the temporal
dimensions of residential care with Giorgio Agamben’s
highly influential vision of the camp as a liminal Bzone
of indistinction^ (Agamben 1998, 25), a place in which
people exist in a state of exception, stripped of their legal
and political identities in a time and space between life
and death. We see another example of this in the fol-
lowing passage:
On New Year’s Day my mother and the other
patients had been dressed in their former clothes
…A parody of real life… The women seem to be
vaguely waiting.
There is nothing to wait for… Here it is all in the
past; there are no more real parties to look forward
to… (45)
Existing in an absurdist Beckettian universe vaguely
waiting for nothing, Ernaux’s description of the patients
here re-inscribes the culturally dominant perception of
dementia as a form of Bbiosocial death^ (Leibing 2006)
or a Bdeath in slow motion^ as Eleanor Cooney puts it
(Cooney 2003). The long-stay geriatric unit is presented
as a space in which meaningful life and social inclusion
come to an end in the period leading up to physical
death. Ernaux emphasizes an indifference that bespeaks
the devaluing of life; Bhere, the things that get lost are
never found. No one cares: they’re going to die
anyway^ (30).
There are many very suggestive and illuminating
analyses of aging and care in Ernaux’s work and of the
literary rendering of her complex and often troubled
relationship with her mother (Motte 1995; Miller
1999; Jordan 2011; Zimmermann 2017). However,
what I want to draw attention to here are some of the
ethical implications of the analogical mediation of de-
mentia via Holocaust metaphors and the correspon-
dences between the aged care facility and the spatiotem-
poral characteristics of the concentration camp. As I
noted above, the symbolic power of this analogy, and
perhaps the reason for its use, resides in its extreme
encapsulation of the perceived impact of dementia upon
personhood. However, this symbolic power is, I would
argue, problematic for a number of reasons. In the first
instance, the analogy used by the writer/observer sym-
bolically reinscribes the very impersonal and debased
effects that the self-same writer or observer laments as
attributes of the neurological impairments associated
with dementia. The peculiar, distinctive subject at the
performative centre of life-writing as an ethical practice
(Eakin 2004, 4) is symbolically displaced. Instead, the
intelligibility or meaning of dementia as a lived experi-
ence is communicated via a broader, de-individuated
cultural category—the death camp Bvictim^—an ontol-
ogy that is defined only in terms of suffering, deficit,
horror, loss, vulnerability. What we have here then is a
representational modality that effaces the contours of the
person in order to communicate something about the
emotional impact of dementia on the writer/observer.
This is explicit in Malabou’s description of her grand-
mother as:
… a stranger who didn’t recognise me, who didn’t
recognise herself because she had undoubtedly
never met her before. Behind the familiar halo of
hair, the tone of her voice, the blue of her eyes: the
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absolutely incontestable presence of someone
else. (Malabou 2012, xii)
In this description,Malabou’s grandmother becomes the
Babsent centre^ aroundwhich she elaborates her discussion
of cerebral trauma and her own emotional suffering. In a
similar manner to Ernaux’s description of the silent woman
with whom her mother shares a room, these descriptions
construe the lived experience of dementia as opaque and
unrepresentable, characterized by a fundamental rupture of
intersubjectivity in that the gaze of the observer is never
returned or acknowledged. This paradigm precludes recog-
nition of the diverse ways in which individuals might live
with particular impairments as well as any notion of the
person with dementia as someone capable of meaningful
interaction, of expressing a preference or exercising choice
or agency. I will return to this distinction between a lifewith
dementia and, what we might call, a death-in-life due to
dementia later in my analysis of the different theoretical
paradigms in contemporary theory that sustain these ideas,
notably in the work of Giorgio Agamben.
The second problem with the death camp analogy is
that it is an abstraction. The postulation of a figure of
universal suffering (the camp victim) serves to extract the
person with dementia from the concrete particularities of
lived experience and dislocate them from the specific
determinants of history. It is remarkable, for instance, that
Ernaux does not connect her mother’s disposition, dis-
tress, or behaviour on the hospital ward to the standards
and management of her care. It is as if there is no
relationship between aspects of her mother’s decline
and inhabiting an environment in which people are tied
to chairs, surrounded by piles of faeces and the smell of
stale, sticky urine. That the significance of her environ-
ment is not addressed arguably tells us a great deal about
the explanatory power accorded to Alzheimer’s disease
as a diagnostic category as if all that Ernaux is able to
Bsee^ and record follows from the pathological process of
the disease itself. However, it is difficult not tomake these
connections in any reading of the text attentive to the
repetition of references to bodily matter, the exposure of
flesh, diapers, and underwear and the reported indiffer-
ence and casual brutalities of the care regime.
From Literature to Cultural Critique
The spectre of the death camp also haunts critical schol-
arship on dementia in the Arts, Humanities, and Social
Sciences. For instance, Annette Leibing, Andrea
Capstick, and Sadie Wearing amongst other scholars in
this field, make reference toGiorgio Agamben’s concept
of Bbare life^ in their discussions of the legal and ethical
status of people with dementia, particularly in relation to
end-of-life care in residential settings (see Leibing 2006;
Capstick 2017; Wearing 2013). For Agamben, we are
living at the Bcatastrophic endpoint of a political tradi-
tion that originates in Greek antiquity and leads to the
National Socialist concentration camps^ (Lemke 2005,
4). His concept of bare life which he describes as the
Bfundamental activity of sovereign power^ (181) un-
folds around his development of Carl Schmitt’s claim
that there is an Bessential contiguity between the state of
exception and sovereignty^ (Agamben 2005, 1).
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign—Bhe who decides
on the state of exception^—revolves around the para-
doxical Bfact that the sovereign is, at the same time,
outside and inside the juridical order^ (Agamben
2005, 2). The sovereign is both inside the law because
the juridical field is coterminous with his territorial
domain, yet also outside the law due to his ability to
suspend the legal order and declare a state of emergency.
Noting the ambiguity that surrounds the definition of
sovereign power as the power to Bdecide on the state of
exception,^ Agamben draws attention to the implica-
tions that follow from the power to enact juridical mea-
sures to suspend the law itself. He uses the laws enacted
by the Nazi regime first to suspend articles of the Wei-
mar Constitution and then to strip Jewish people of their
citizenship as an example of this phenomenon—what he
describes as the Bvoluntary creation of a permanent state
of emergency^ (2005, 2). The state of exception thus
Bappears as the legal form of what cannot have legal
form^ (2005, 1).
Agamben locates the origins of this constitutive am-
biguity in the Aristotelian distinction between biological
life (zoé) and political existence (bíos) or between Blaw
and the living being^ (Agamben 1998, 2). Sovereign
power is thus manifest in the articulation of a threshold
between legal-political status and Bbare life.^ It is im-
portant that we understand the latter as a politicized
category rather than as biological existence per se; Bbare
life^ is an attribution predicated upon the exclusionary
logic of the state of exception. It is produced rather than
revealed by the operative mechanisms of sovereign
power. This is exemplified for Agamben in the figure
of homo sacer derived from Roman Law (1998). This
sacred man denotes the human who can be killed
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without the commission of a crime, in other words, one
who is no longer subject to the rights and recognition
conferred by legal or political status (1998). As he puts
it, Bevery society sets this limit; every society—even the
most modern—decides who its ‘sacred men’ will be^
(1998, 139). Thus the stripping of citizenship from
Jewish people by the Third Reich facilitated the geno-
cide; the concentration camp prisoners could be killed
without the commission of a criminal act. However,
whilst the production of Bbare life^ is, for Agamben, a
longstanding characteristic of sovereign power, he ar-
gues that today the Bstate of exception tends increasing-
ly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in
contemporary politics^ (2005, 2), producing a
Bthreshold of indeterminancy^ between democracy
and totalitarianism (1998, 121) or absolutism (2005,
2). It also means that Bwe are all virtually homines
sacri^ (1998, 115):
Along with the emergence of biopolitics, we can
observe a displacement and gradual expansion
beyond the limits of the decision on bare life, in
the state of exception, in which sovereignty
consisted. If there is a line in every modern state
marking the point at which the decision on life
becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can
turn into thanatopolitics, this line no longer ap-
pears today as a stable border dividing two clearly
distinct zones. This line is now in motion and
gradually moving into areas other than that of
political life, areas in which the sovereign is en-
tering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not
only with the jurist but also with the doctor, the
scientist, the expert, and the priest […] From this
perspective, the camp—as the pure, absolute, and
impassable biopolitical space (in so far as it is
founded solely on the state of exception)—will
appear as the hidden paradigm of the political
space of modernity. (1998, 122–123, my ellipses)
In developing his thesis, Agamben refers to dis-
tinctively modern categories such as Bovercoma^
and Bbrain death^ (1998, 160–165) as examples of
the attribution of human lives that can be killed
without the commission of a crime and of the
enmeshing of political power with the institutions
and authority of medicine and the law. As this indi-
cates, his argument is that the thanatopolitical logic
of contemporary power is not simply manifest in the
genocidal intent of totalitarian regimes but
encompasses us all, finding its expression in multi-
ple domains from the internment of Bnon-lawful
enemy combatants^ in Guantanamo Bay (see
Gregory 2004) to the decision to terminate life sup-
port or legally to assist suicide.
Bare Life and the Case of Peter Singer
We can see Agamben’s Bhidden paradigm^ reflected
in the preference utilitarianism of bioethicists such
as Peter Singer. Singer’s call to Brethink life and
death^ in the context of the capacity of contempo-
rary medical technologies (Singer 1996) to sustain,
terminate, and produce new forms of life is predi-
cated upon a notion of the differential value of some
lives over others. Singer’s argument is that we must
separate personhood from species being and that
personhood itself should be established with refer-
ence to the Lockean concept of psychological con-
tinuity and the capacity to understand oneself as a
being in time (with a past and a future), allied
notions of autonomy, the capacity to plan and to
desire and to value being alive. Medical and legal
expertise play a key role in the determination—or
perhaps more accurately—the attribution of person-
hood in Singer’s work. Like Agamben’s sacred men,
Singer’s non-persons are produced by the articula-
tion of a distinction between the person and the
merely human. Significantly for any discussion of
dementia, in a section of Rethinking Life and Death
on voluntary euthanasia, he presents the case of
Janet Adkins, a woman in the early stages of
Alzheimer’s who decided to end her life with the
help of Jack Kevorkian before her condition
progressed to the extent that she was unable to make
such a decision. He notes:
Adkins tried an experimental treatment for
Alzheimer’s. It didn’t work. She then decided that
she wanted to die, while she was still capable of
thinking coherently. She had heard of a Michigan
pathologist, Dr Jack Kevorkian, who had devel-
oped a Bsuicide machine^ and offered to make it
available to people who were incurably ill and
wanted to die … She contacted Dr Kevorkian
who discussed her desire to die with her, and then
asked her to get her doctor to send him her medical
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records. After he had studied them, Kevorkian
agreed to help Adkins. (Singer 1996, 133)
Devoid of any exploration of family dynamics, the
particular people and personalities involved, and of the
potentially overwhelming emotional freight that must
have accompanied this decision, Singer’s version of the
case presents Adkin’s decision as both an exemplar and
justification of what he presents as an emergent ethics of
choice in the domain of life/death decision-making. It is
evoked to add further ballast to his wider argument that
the traditional ethical principle of the sanctity of human
life should be displaced in favour of a judgement based
upon Bchoice^ (i.e. making a decision to die) or a test of
personhood. His narrative concludes with reference to
the five medical members of the jury that eventually
tried and acquitted Jack Kevorkian (over the case of
Thomas Hyde, a man with Lou Gehrig’s disease, rather
than Janet Adkins), two of whom are cited as evoking an
individual’s Bright^ to choose whether to live or die
(1996). Of course, the very evocation of a discourse of
Brights^ in this context underlines the extent to which
the notion of choice as a right is conceptualized in legal
terms and thus not a matter of an unmediated individual
freedom Bto choose^ at all.
Singer retains a strong sense that it remains in the pay
of legal and medical experts to validate and to confer
such a right to choose upon the individual. His account
makes it clear that it is Kevorkian who actually makes
the decision to facilitate Adkins’ suicide after the scru-
tiny of her medical records, and it is the medical profes-
sionals on the jury who validate Kevorkian’s actions and
thus implicitly support Singer’s argument. He constructs
the plight of Adkins and those in similar positions
primarily as a problem for Bjurists and doctors^ (see
Agamben 1998, 136–143) and ethicists such as himself
rather than for those personally involved in the particu-
lar dilemma at stake.
The coalescence of medical and politico-legal ele-
ments in Singer’s work exemplifies Agamben’s claim
that today Bthe physician and the scientist move in the
no-man’s-land into which at one point the sovereign
alone could penetrate^ (1998, 159). The claim that today
Bbare life inheres within us all^ (1998, 115) is certainly
integral to the re-envisioning of life, death, and person-
hood we see in Singer’s work and in broader debates
around capacity, cognition, and personhood and eutha-
nasia and assisted dying. Crucially, for Agamben, the
politico-legal and medical nexus that underpins the
definition of personhood and decision- making around
the end of life is wholly continuous with the logic of the
concentration camp:
…if the essence of the camp consists in the mate-
rialization of the state of exception and in the
subsequent creation of a space in which bare life
and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of
indistinction then we must admit that we find our
self virtually in the presence of a camp every time
such a structure is created, independent of the kinds
of crime that are committed there. (1998 174)
Viewed through the lens of Agamben’s philosophy,
Singer’s situation of a criterialist concept of personhood
within a medical and legal framework exemplifies the
operative mechanisms of the state of exception and
Agamben’s notion of Bbare life^ as an attribution. Whilst
both philosophers view the politicization of life itself
from very different ethical perspectives, they both en-
dorse a fundamentally legalistic conception of
biopolitical governmentality (Lemke 2005), at the centre
of which is a notion of an essentially powerless human
subject whose legal and political recognition is not a
given. It is not difficult to see why Agamben’s concept
of Bbare life^ has been appropriated in scholarship that
explores the notion of dementia as a form of Bbiosocial
death^ (Leibing 2006) and the residential care home as
death camp (Capstick 2017); a liminal space in which
rights and recognition are suspended. We can certainly
identify affinities between Agamben’s philosophical dis-
course and the figurative language and tropes that per-
vade Ernaux’s writing. Agamben’s crystallization of the
mechanisms of contemporary biopolitics in the paradigm
of the camp is a powerful and compelling symbol of
contemporary sovereign power and the capacity of the
state to remove particular groups of people from the
protective framework of legal, political, and social recog-
nition. However, in a similar manner to Ernaux, his work
offers up an essentially abstract envisioning of the pow-
erless and abjected human subject Bmaterialized^ by the
exclusionary logic of the state of exception. Although his
thesis makes reference to a historical event—the Holo-
caust—it is profoundly ahistorical in its utilization of the
camp as a paradigmatic structure rather than a distinct
historical occurrence.
We may locate some of the reasons for this ahistori-
cism in the linguistic rather than historical/political un-
derpinnings of his theory. Understanding the linguistic
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foundations of Agamben’s thinking is important if we
are to grasp the ethical and political implications of his
work and its usefulness in relation to our understanding
of the political and ethical dimensions of thinking about
dementia today. It is to these foundations that I wish
now to turn.
Language, Law, and Life
In the introduction to their collection of essays entitled,
TheWork of Giorgio Agamben, the editors, Justin Clem-
ens, Nicholas Heron, and AlexMurray draw attention to
the specifically poetic and linguistic foundations of
Agamben’s thinking. Emphasizing the continuity be-
tween his earlier writings on the philosophy of language,
aesthetics, and literature and his later more explicitly
political engagement with questions of biopower and
sovereignty, the collection is subtitled BLaw, Literature,
Life.^ In his contribution to the collection, BThe Role of
the Shifter and the Problem of Reference in Giorgio
Agamben,^ Justin Clemens argues that Agamben’s fun-
damental ontological concerns with the category of
potentiality and the typological paradox of the state of
exception, cannot be separated from the conceptual
problems related to deixis or the linguistic shifter. BIf
one misses the centrality of Agamben’s philological
deconstruction of grammatical problems to his thinking
as a whole,^ Clemens notes, Bone will also miss what’s
important about his method and key concepts^
(Clemens 2008, 47). Indeed, Bthe problem of being—
the supreme metaphysical problem,^ as Agamben him-
self argues, Bemerges from the very beginning as insep-
arable from the problem of the significance of the de-
monstrative pronoun^ (Agamben 1991, 16–17).
Demonstrative pronouns are pronouns that identity
specific nouns, for example, this, that, these, and those.
They are examples of the grammatical category known
as deixis, also described as Bshifters.^ This category,
often described as Bverbal pointing,^ refers to expres-
sions and markers in language that cannot be fully
comprehended without additional contextual informa-
tion relating to person (BI,^ Byou^), place (Bhere,^
Bthere,^ Bthis,^ Bthat), time (Bnow,^ Bthen^). For in-
stance, the utterance Bthis city^ is only meaningful if
we are aware of the city in which the utterance takes
place. Deixis thus entails the suturing of the utterance to
the speaker and the moment of enunciation (Clemens
2008, 46). It is the particular characteristics of these
shifters that interest Agamben:
It is certainly possible to define something like a
meaning of the shifters BI^, Byou^, Bnow ,^ Bhere^
but this meaning is completely foreign to the
meaning of other linguistic signs. BI^ is neither a
notion or a substance, and enunciation concerns
not what is said in discourse but the pure fact that
it is said, the event of language as such, which is
by definition ephemeral. Like the philosophers’
concept of Being, enunciation is what is most
unique and concrete, since it refers to the abso-
lutely singular and unrepeatable event of dis-
course in act; but at the same time, it is what is
most vacuous and generic, since it is always re-
peated without it ever being possible to assign it
any lexical reality. (Agamben 1999b, 138)
As Clemens (2008) notes, Agamben’s argument here
draws upon Emile Benveniste’s theorization of the shift-
er as that which enacts the deconstruction of the gram-
matical dualism that founds much of modern linguistics,
namely the distinction between what Ferdinand de Saus-
sure terms langue (the structure of language or relations
between signs in a language system) and parole (the
individual speech utterance) (Saussure 1983;
Benveniste 1973). On the one hand, a pronoun such as
I is conventionally accepted to represent an Bindividual
concept^’ or element within langue. On the other hand,
since the I can be assumed by various different speaking
subjects in a linguistic utterance, Bthere is,^ argues
Benveniste Bno, concept of I encompassing all the I’s
uttered at every single moment by every single speaker^
(1973, 226). In other words, the BI^ has no positive
relation to an individual concept within langue: Bthere
is no lexical entity named by the I^ (226). However, the
situational nature of the shifter within linguistic
discourse—the fact that it refers to an immediate context
of utterance that is changeable—also means that a pro-
noun such as BI^ cannot be located simply on the plane
of the utterance or parole. As Benveniste concludes, the
personal pronoun Bcan only be identified by the instance
of discourse^ or the Bact of speaking in which it is
uttered^ (218). The significance of the shifter or person-
al pronoun therefore refers to an extra-conceptual and
pre-subjective Breality of discourse^ that can be con-
ceived of as the taking place of language. Importantly,
this taking place deconstructs the dualistic distinction
between langue and parole (linguistic structure and
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utterance) because personal pronouns, as Benveniste
notes, Bare distinguished from all other designations a
language articulates in that they do not refer either to a
concept or to an individual^ (226).
In terms of Agamben’s philosophy, what we see in
his consideration of the shifter is an account of the
elision of two previously distinct categories—langue
and parole—in a zone of indistinction. The BI^ is both
Binside and outside the categorical^ and both Bunique
and vacuous^ (Attell 2015, 68). The shifter has no real
material or conceptual referent apart from the fact of its
taking place. It is thus, Bthe transcategorical ontological
operator that effects the link between the linguistic and
the extra linguistic^ (Attell 2015, 66). Crucially, for
Agamben, the shifter’s transitional nature is related to
a profound ontological destiny of human beings. As he
notes in Infancy and History, the distinction between
humans and other living animals is not simply produced
via a notion of linguistic ability alone. Animals, he
argues Bare already inside language^ whereas humans
precede speech in a state of Binfancy^ and Bin order to
speak [man] has to constitute himself as the subject of
language—he has to say ‘I’^ (Agamben 1993, 59–60).
The difference between a human animal and a human
being as such is, then, marked by this destinal transition
between language and discourse that takes place as the
human emerges from their infancy. According to
Agamben, however, this Breality of discourse^—the
transition between langue and parole—theoretically
structures every instance of human language and thus
the human being is said to exist in a permanent state of
infancy, as he terms it. As such, human life is configured
as a bare space of potentiality that is marked by a distinct
elision of two previously distinct concepts that enter into
a state of exception or indistinction. The human is thus,
according to Agamben, a Bwhatever being^ (Agamben
2005), defined by Bnothing other than this very passage
from pure language to discourse^ (Agamben 1993, 64).
Agamben thus develops a critical system that typi-
cally operates by revealing the elision between the du-
alistic divisions ofWesternmetaphysics. His ontological
theory of human potentiality is, like his concept of bare
life, achieved via an operational mechanics that brings
together two previously distinct categories into aporetic
zone of indistinction or state of exception. Indeed, as
Antonio Negri notes, for Agamben, the logic of
biopolitics and human infancy means that all aspects
of human sociality are Bbipolar and transitive: home and
city, zoe and bios, life and politics, [langue and parole],
flow from one to the other, and are situated within an
ever reversible flow^ (Negri 2007, 117).
Conclusion: Beyond the Paradigm of the Camp
Acknowledging the linguistic foundations upon which
Agamben’s thinking is predicated is vital if we are fully
to understand the provenance of his writings on history
and contemporary biopolitics (Prozorov 2014) It also
enables us to reflect critically on the political and ethical
limitations of figurations of dementia as a form of Bbare
life^ and the aligned criterialist concept of personhood
that we find in Peter Singer’s work. (The latter concept,
as I indicate above, enacts the form of biopolitical
governmentality that Agamben describes).
When placed within this broader linguistic and onto-
logical framework, Agamben’s concepts of homo sacer
and bare life can be viewed as metaphors for his linguis-
tic ontology; evocative figures of speech but ultimately
ones that can be severed from the particular historical
situations in which theymay be deployed as explanatory
or Bmeaning-making^ devices. Although Agamben’s
philosophy bears the scars of history, particularly that
of the Holocaust death camp, the notion of Bbare life^ is
essentially ahistorical—the expression of a philosophi-
cal legacy rather than of the concrete particularities of
history itself. Thus, as many scholars have noted, the
powerful claim that bare life inheres within us all
(Agamben 1998) fails to differentiate between radically
distinct scenarios, for instance, between the person on
life support with a cataclysmic brain injury and the
prisoners in the camp (see Rabinow and Rose 2006).
Nor is it able to address the specific historical and
economic determinants that render people more or less
vulnerable to this attribution.
We can therefore see how the ahistorical nature of
Agamben’s concept of bare life lends itself to a medical
epistemology of dementia that foregrounds particular
pathological processes and symptoms at the expense
of the peculiarities and context-specific experiences of
living with dementia. When the rich, messiness of em-
bodied experience is reduced to the stark contours of a
diagnosis we place the historicity of dementia itself in
parenthesis and assume instead a stable and knowable
Bdisease^ process without Bhistory.^ The effects of this
are manifest in the emphasis upon abjection and passiv-
ity that we see in Ernaux and Malabou’s descriptions of
dementia as both the origin of suffering and of the
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destruction of personhood as if the peculiarities of per-
sonal history, relationships, environment, culture, and
community have no bearing on their perception.
As I have indicated above, it is no surprise then that
these cultural configurations of dementia lend them-
selves to a theoretical engagement with the work of
Agamben. As one of Agamben’s main interlocutors,
Alain Badiou puts it, Agamben envisions the human
as essentially delicate or Bcrushed by the crass commo-
tion of powers^ (Badiou 2009, 558–559). Whilst this
has obvious descriptive and empirical force, there are, as
Badiou also suggests, potential problems with the pos-
tulation of bare life as our ontological or linguistic
destiny and I would argue that these problems are par-
ticularly acute for scholarship on dementia that attempts
to think about the ethics and politics of long life, illness,
dependency, and care.
Agamben’s configuration of our ontology is one that
foregrounds the weakness or passivity of humans as
destiny. Our abjection, whether potential or real, is
something that inheres within us all. For Badiou, this
is problematic for it is grounded upon an ahistorical
conception of humanity envisioned as an essentially
passive figure reduced to a state of pure being. Rather
than enquire into the possibilities for what Badiou calls
the Baffirmative becoming of truths^ (Badiou 2009,
514) or historical and social change, the very nature of
Agamben’s ahistorical linguistic ontology precludes the
concrete realization of a new vision of human commu-
nity. The concept of bare life in this sense reinscribes the
vulnerability it describes rather than offering a way of
thinking beyond it.
Comparisons between the care home and the camp
and between the person with dementia and the Holo-
caust victim serve as powerful expressions of abjection
and vulnerability at the limits of life. However, these
figurations, based as they are on a linguistic and thus
ahistorical ontology, ultimately occlude the historicity of
particular ways of managing and organizing care, and of
understanding cognitive impairment in later life. In-
stead, the diverse ways in which people live with de-
mentia are subsumed within a powerful symbolic ab-
straction that precludes us from imagining life with
dementia as a potential site of agency or as the locus
for transformative ideas about care, community, and
non-instrumentalist conceptions of human value. With
this in mind, I would propose that any ethically based
engagement from scholars that intends to identify and
also transform the current constellation of social,
institutional, economic, and medical practices that de-
termine our understandings and experience of dementia
must attend to the implications of the theory on which
they ground this very engagement. As I have argued
above, a theory grounded on ontologically derived no-
tions of weakness, passivity, and remainders may not be
what we are looking for or what we need. Instead, in our
work may want to think about new foundations for our
understanding of living and experiencing old age, de-
pendency, and dementia.
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